XI.1 The Rumanian Campaign
Our political situation with regard to Rumania during the campaigning year of 1915-16 had made exceptionally high demands not only on our statesmen but on our army leaders as well. It is a piece of cheap wisdom to criticize the authorities and individuals then responsible after the entry of Rumania into the circle of our enemies and in view of our inadequate military preparations to meet the new foe. Such judgements, usually based on voluntary assertions and passed without knowledge of the real circumstances, remind me of an expression of Fichte in his Reden an die Deutsche Nation, in which he speaks of that brand of writer who always knows exactly what was going to happen after a success has been achieved.
There can hardly be any doubt that if the Entente had been in our position they would have eliminated the Rumanian danger, or perhaps it would be better to say the Rumanian military menace, by 1915 at the latest by the employment of methods such as they used against Greece. As was to be revealed later, Rumania was driven into the whirlpool of war by an ultimatum from the Entente in the summer of 1916. In that ultimatum Rumania was required either to intervene immediately or to renounce her schemes of aggrandizement forever. However, a solution of that kind would have been politically too high-handed to have found adherents among us without the very gravest necessity. We thought we ought to deal properly with Rumania, though certainly hoping that she would dig her own grave. That is exactly what happened, but after what crises and sacrifices!
Rumania's entry into the war on the side of our enemies was drawing very nigh when the Austrian Eastern Front collapsed. It is not impossible that the danger could have been averted even then if effect could have been given to the German plan of a great counterattack against the Russian southern wing which had reached the Carpathians. This operation was not carried out simply owing to the series of collapses on the Austro-Hungarian front. The forces to have been used for attack were swallowed up in the defense.
In view of the course the fighting on the Eastern Front was taking in the middle of August, the German General Staff, in conjunction with General Jekoff, had adopted the emergency measure of delivering a great blow against the Entente forces at Salonica with the Bulgarian wing armies. The idea was a thoroughly sound one both from the military and political point of view. If the enterprise succeeded, we could expect that Rumania would be cowed and there would be an end to her hopes — hopes she must even then have been cherishing — of cooperating with Sarrail. Rumania would probably be compelled to remain inactive if strong Bulgarian forces were released for employment elsewhere after a victory over Sarrail. The German General Staff, indeed, found itself placed to a certain extent in a military quandary through this very attack of the Bulgarians. As they were compelled to concentrate troops in Northern Bulgaria to exercise a restraining influence on war fever in Rumania, which was growing stronger every day, forces which might have been employed for the attack on Sarrail on the Macedonian front had to be sent to the Danube for political reasons. The action of Main Headquarters was explained on the one hand by their confidence in the offensive capacity of the Bulgarian Army and on the other by a certain underestimate of the enemy's strength at Salonica. In particular we were absolutely deceived about the value of the newly-formed Serbian units, six infantry divisions, which had made their appearance there.
As regards the Bulgarian attack in Macedonia, the army on the left wing reached the Struma, but, on the other hand, that on the right wing could not get through in the direction of Vodena. The enterprise was hung up at this point for reasons the discussion of which would carry us too far afield. On this occasion the Bulgarian infantry fought splendidly in attack, but were handled with more energy than skill. They gained glory, but victory had slipped from their grasp. This conclusion of the attack in Macedonia faced Main Headquarters with a new and difficult problem. The Rumanian war fever was continually on the increase. It was to be expected that the pause in the Bulgarian operation in Macedonia would rouse the warlike passions of political circles in Bucharest. Should the German General Staff now break off the Bulgarian attack finally with a view to bringing to northern Bulgaria strong Bulgarian forces from the Macedonian front, which had now been materially shortened, or should they venture to transfer to Macedonia the forces they had assembled on the Danube with a view to renewing the attempt to cut the Rumanian Gordian knot with the sword? Rumania's declaration of war solved the problem for Main Headquarters.
Thus had the general situation developed south of the Danube. Not less difficult was the situation north of the Transylvanian Alps. For while Rumania was openly arming, the battles on the German Western Front, as well as those on the Austrian Eastern and Southwestern Fronts, were using up all the troops which Main Headquarters seemed to have available as reserves or could possibly still be drawn from parts of the front which were not being attacked. It seemed impossible to release any troops for use against Rumania.
The result was that the Rumanian Declaration of War found us practically defenseless against the new enemy. I have devoted myself expressly to the development of this situation because I wish to make clear how the great crisis arose with which we found ourselves faced on and after that day. It can hardly be denied that such a crisis existed in view of the subsequent victorious course of the campaign.
But although the Quadruple Alliance had only made inadequate preparations to meet the Rumanian danger, it goes without saying that their responsible military leaders had come to a decision in good time about the appropriate measures for this eventuality. For this purpose a conference of the Commanders-in-Chief of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria had been held at Pless on July 28, 1916. It resulted in the adoption of a plan of campaign in which the following words figured in the decisive Cipher 2:
"If Rumania joins the Entente, the most rapid advance in the greatest possible strength, to keep the war certainly from Bulgarian soil, and as far as possible from Austro-Hungarian, and invade Rumania. For this purpose
(a) Demonstration of German and Austrian troops from the north, with a view to tying down strong Rumanian forces.
(b) Rapid advance of Bulgarian troops over the frontier of the Dobrudja against the Danube crossings at Silistria and Tutrakan, with a view to protecting the right flank of the main force.
(c) Prepare the main force to cross the Danube at Nikopoli, with a view to attack on Bucharest."
The share of the Turks in a Rumanian campaign was arranged at a conference held with Enver Pasha at Budapest shortly afterwards. Enver undertook to prepare two Turkish divisions for speedy employment in the Balkan Peninsula.
While my predecessor still held the reins no changes were made in this plan of campaign against Rumania. However, the different Commanders-in-Chief met several times to exchange ideas about it. Moreover, Field-Marshal von Mackensen, who had been appointed to command the troops concentrated south of the Danube, was also heard on the subject. On these occasions two currents of thought were clearly distinguishable. General Conrad favored the idea of a speedy and relentless advance on Bucharest, while General Jekoff wished to open the campaign in the Dobrudja. When war broke out the forces south of the Danube were still much too weak to carry out simultaneously the double task, i.e. effect a crossing of the Danube and attack Silistria and Tutrakan, which had been set them on this front.
On August 28th my predecessor issued orders to Field-Marshal von Mackensen to attack as soon as possible. The direction and the objective were left to his discretion.
Such was the military situation with regard to Rumania when I took over the conduct of operations on August 29th.
It is certain that so relatively small a state as Rumania had never before been given a role so important, and, indeed, so decisive for the history of the world at so favorable a moment. Never before had two great Powers like Germany and Austria found themselves so much at the mercy of the military resources of a country which had scarcely one-twentieth of the population of the two great states. Judging by the military situation, it was to be expected that Rumania had only to advance where she wished to decide the World War in favor of those Powers which had been hurling themselves at us in vain for years. Thus everything seemed to depend on whether Rumania was ready to make any sort of use of her momentary advantage.
Nowhere was this fact appreciated more clearly, felt more keenly, and regarded with more apprehension than in Bulgaria. Her government hesitated to declare war. Can they be reproached on that account? Whatever may be the answer, when Bulgaria decided in our favor, on September 1st, the nation placed themselves at our side with all their resources, and inspired by all the hatred which dated from the Rumanian attack in their rear in the year 1913 when the country was engaged in a desperate it struggle with Serbia and Greece. The murderous day of Tutrakan gave us the first proofs of the warlike ardor of our ally.
In view of our defective preparations, the plan of campaign which had been adopted had lost its original significance. In the first place the enemy had complete freedom of action. Thanks to the state of his preparations and numerical strength, which, unknown to us, had been materially increased by Russian help, it was to be feared that our own forces would be inadequate to limit the Rumanian High Command's freedom of movement to any appreciable degree at the outset. Great objectives and easy victories seemed to beckon to the Rumanians whereever they chose to begin operations — whether across the Alps against Transylvania, or from the Dobrudja against Bulgaria. I was particularly afraid of a Russo-Rumanian offensive towards the south. Bulgarians themselves had expressed doubts whether their soldiers would fight against the Russians. General Jekoff's firm confidence in that respect — I mentioned this earlier on — was by no means universally shared in Bulgaria. No one could doubt that our enemy would rely on Russophile sentiment in at least a large part of the Bulgarian Army. Quite apart from that, it would have been easy for the Rumanians to hold out a hand to Sarrail's army by an attack on the south. What would our position be if the enemy once again succeeded in interrupting our communications with Turkey — the situation which had existed before we embarked on the campaign against Serbia — or, worse still, forcing Bulgaria out of the alliance? Turkey, isolated and simultaneously threatened from Armenia and Thrace, and Austria-Hungary, left with practically no hope, would never have survived a change in the situation so unfavorable to us.
The immediate advance of Mackensen, which my predecessor had ordered, was entirely in keeping with the needs of the hour. On the other hand, there could be no question of a crossing of the Danube with the forces available in northern Bulgaria. It would be enough for our purposes if we robbed the enemy of the initiative in the Dobrudja, and so upset his plan of campaign. But if we were to attain the last object really effectively we must not limit the Field-Marshal's attack to the capture of Tutrakan and Silistria. It would be much better, by exploiting to the full the success in the southern Dobrudja, to try and make the Rumanian High Command anxious about the rear of their main force which was on the Transylvanian frontier. In that we absolutely succeeded. In view of the Field-Marshal's progress to within a menacing distance of the Constanza—Cernavoda line, the Rumanian Commander-in-Chief found himself compelled to send reinforcements to the Dobrudja from the forces engaged in his operations against Transylvania. At the same time, by bringing up other fresh troops, he tried to take Mackensen's offensive in the rear from Rahovo, downstream from Rustchuk. A fine plan on paper! Whether it was a Rumanian inspiration or that of one of her allies is still unknown, even today. After the experiences which the Rumanians had had of us before the day of this Rahovo interlude, I regarded the enterprise as more than bold, and not only thought to myself but said openly: "These troops will all be caught!" This desire, clothed in appropriate orders, was fulfilled by the Germans and Bulgarians in the best possible style. Of the dozen Rumanian battalions which reached the southern bank of the Danube at Rahovo, not a single man saw his home again during the war.
Disaster now overtook Rumania because her army did not march, her military leaders had no understanding, and at long last we succeeded in concentrating sufficient forces in Transylvania before it was too late.
Sufficient! Unquestionably sufficient for this enemy! We might possibly be called rash to the point of madness if the relative strengths were alone considered. However, we took the offensive against the Rumanian Army, and on September 29th General von Falkenhayn destroyed the Rumanian western wing at Hermannstadt.
After the Battle of Hermannstadt the general threw his army eastward. Disregarding the danger of the Rumanian numerical superiority and their favorable position north of the Upper Aluta, he swept his main columns south of this river, along the foot of the mountains, towards Kronstadt. The Rumanians hesitated, lost confidence in their numerical superiority, as in their own capabilities, made no attempt to exploit the situation which was still favorable to them, and halted on the whole front. Even as they did so they took the first steps in retreat. General von Falkenhayn had now secured the initiative completely, overcame the enemy's resistance south of the Geisterwald, and marched on. The Rumanians were now in full retreat at all points from Transylvania, not without suffering another bloody defeat at Kronstadt on October 8th. They thus retired to the protecting wall of their country. Our next task was to get over this wall. At first we had great hopes of strategically exploiting our previous tactical successes by forcing our way directly to Bucharest from Kronstadt. Though the rugged mountains and the enemy superiority set our few weak divisions a very heavy task, the advantages of a breakthrough from this direction were much too obvious for us to neglect the attempt. It did not succeed, though our troops fought stoutly for every peak, every cliff, and every boulder. Our advance was completely held up when a severe early winter laid a mantle of snow on the mountains and turned the roads into icy streams. In spite of unspeakable privations and sufferings, our troops held all the ground they had gained, ready to press on when time and opportunity should allow.
Our previous experiences showed us that we must find another road into the Wallachian Plain than that which led from Kronstadt across the broadest part of the Transylvanian Alps. General von Falkenhayn proposed an irruption through the Szurduk Pass, farther west. Of course, this direction was less effective from a strategic point of view, but under existing circumstances it was the only one possible from a tactical and technical point of view. We thus invaded Rumania through this pass on November 11th.
Meanwhile General von Mackensen had been ready, south of the Danube, to join hands with the invasion from the north. On October 21st he had thoroughly beaten the Russo-Rumanian army south of the Constanza—Cemavoda line. On the 22nd Constanza had fallen into the hands of the Bulgarian 3rd Army. The enemy retired north, at top speed. However, we broke off our pursuit as soon as a line of defense had been reached north of the railway which could be held with comparatively small forces. All the troops that could possibly be spared were sent to Sistova. Alluring was the prospect of occupying the whole of the Dobrudja, and then forcing our way to the rear of the Rumanian main armies in the region north of the Danube. The only question was — how were we to get the necessary bridging material to the northern Dobrudja? There were no railways there, and the Rumanian batteries on the northern bank of the Danube prevented us from using the river. We had to thank the gods that these batteries had not destroyed our one available heavy bridging train at Sistova long before, although it had been within range of the enemy guns for months, and owed its escape solely to what we regarded as an inexplicable omission on their part. We were thus able to contemplate the crossing of the river, at any rate at that point.
In the grey morning hours of November 23rd Field-Marshal von Mackensen gained a footing on the northern bank of the Danube. The direct cooperation between him and General von Falkenhayn, for which we had been working, was achieved. It was crowned by the destruction of the Rumanian main force on the battlefield of the Argesch. The curtain came down on the last act on December 8th. Bucharest fell into our hands without resistance.
In the evening of that day I concluded my general report on the military situation with the words, "A splendid day." When I stepped out into the winter night later on, the church tower of the town of Pless was already pealing forth for the great new victory. For a long time I had been thinking of nothing else but the wonderful achievements of our brave army and hoping that these feats would bring us nearer to the conclusion of the terrible struggle and its great sacrifices.
It must be admitted that we had imagined the capture of the Rumanian capital as a rather more military affair. We had thought Bucharest was a powerful fortress, brought up our heaviest siege artillery to reduce it, and now the famous place d'armes had turned out to be no more than an open town. There were no longer any guns on the mighty walls of the forts, and the armored cupolas had been replaced by wooden roofs. Our spying in peacetime, of which the enemy had so much to say, had not even managed to discover that the fortress of Bucharest had been dismantled before the Rumanian campaign began.
The fate of Rumania had been brought to a dramatic conclusion. The whole world must see, and Rumania saw it well enough, that the old rhyme of the German pikeman was more than a mere empty sound:
"Wer Unglück will im Kriege ham,
Der binde mit dem Deutschen an."
["If anyone wants a disastrous war, let him pick a quarrel with the German."]
In quoting this verse I do not wish in any way to depreciate the value of the help which Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria gave in this great and splendid enterprise. Our allies were all in their places and cooperated loyally in the heroic task. Rumania, who had had the fate of the world in her hands, must have been thankful that the remnants of her army were saved from destruction by Russian help. Her dream that, as in 1878 on the battlefield of Plevna, Russia would press her hand for services rendered in dutiful gratitude, though with bitter feelings at heart, had been cruelly reversed. Times had changed.
At the end of October 1916, I had given my All-Highest War Lord my opinion that by the end of the year we should have concluded the Rumanian campaign. On December 31st I was able to report to His Majesty that our troops had reached the Sereth and that the Bulgarians were on the southern side of the Danube delta. We had reached our goal.
XI.2 The Fighting on the Macedonian Front
The difficulties of our military situation had been materially increased in the autumn of 1916 by the course of the fighting on the Macedonian front.
Sarrail's army would have lost its very raison d'être if it had not taken the offensive itself at the time of the Rumanian declaration of war. We expected it to attack in the valley of the Vardar. If it had done so, and reached the neighbourhood of Gradsko, it would have seized the central point of the most important Bulgarian communications and made it impossible for the Bulgarians to remain in the district of Monastir. Sarrail chose to make a direct attack on Monastir, perhaps compelled by special political considerations. As the result of his offensive the Bulgarian Army on the right wing was driven from its position, south of Florina, which it had won in the August offensive. In the further course of the fighting it lost Monastir, but then managed to hold fast. These events had compelled us to send reinforcements to the Bulgarians from our own battlefronts, reinforcements which had nearly all been earmarked for the Rumanian campaign. If the amount of help we sent — about twenty battalions and many heavy and field batteries — was not very large compared with our whole resources, this sacrifice was imposed on us at an extremely critical moment in which every man and gun had to be economized.
Like ourselves, Turkey willingly sent help to her Bulgarian ally in her hard struggle. In addition to the reinforcements promised for the Rumanian campaign, Enver Pasha sent a whole Turkish Army Corps to relieve Bulgarian troops on the Struma front. This reinforcement was not accepted very willingly by the Bulgarians. They were afraid that it would form the basis for unpleasant political claims on the part of Turkey. However, Enver Pasha assured us expressly that he would prevent any such claims being formulated. It was quite comprehensible that Bulgaria should prefer German reinforcements to Turkish, but it was incomprehensible that Sofia would not see that Germany was in no position at this moment to increase the burden on her forces.
In my opinion the loss of Monastir had no military importance. In a military sense it would have been a great advantage if the Bulgarian right wing had been voluntarily withdrawn to the extraordinarily strong positions at Prilep, as this would have materially facilitated the work of supply to the Bulgarian army and correspondingly hampered that of the enemy. It was just the enormous difficulties the Bulgarians had had with their communications which had greatly contributed to the crises which had supervened time after time in the recent battles. The troops had had to go hungry all day, and occasionally suffered from lack of ammunition. Putting our own interests on one side, we had done everything in our power to enable the Bulgarians to overcome these difficulties. The length of the communications to the rear, and the nature of this rugged and barren mountain region made the solution of this problem uncommonly difficult.
In the battles for Monastir the Bulgarians had had their first experience of heavy fighting on the defensive. Although the previous reports of our officers about the condition of the Bulgarian Army had spoken brilliantly of the splendid spirit displayed by the men in attack, these now began to speak of a certain reluctance to face long and continuous hostile artillery fire. This may seem a surprising assertion, but it is confirmed by the experience of all peoples, on the enemy's side as well as ours, who enter upon war with their so-called natural, primitive courage. It looks as if the nerve-racking effects of modern offensive weapons demand for an unshakable defense something more than this primitive courage, something which can only come from a higher training of the will. In the bulk of our German raw material there seems to be the right mixture of moral and physical powers which, combined with our military training of the will, enable our men successfully to resist the fearful effects of a modern battle. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army realized this sensitiveness of his men to which I have referred. With soldierly frankness he told us of his concern on this point, though he was far from being of an anxious temperament.
XI.3 The Asiatic theaters
In view of the position which the German Chief of the General Staff now occupied within the framework of the combined operations, we were compelled to take an active interest in the course of events in the Asiatic theaters also. When Enver Pasha visited our Headquarters at the beginning of 1918 our estimate of the situation in Asia ,was as follows:
The Russian offensive in Armenia, after reaching the line Trebizond—Erzingan had come to a standstill. The Turkish offensive, which in the summer of this year had begun in the south from the direction of Diabekr against the left flank of this Russian advance, had made no progress owing to the extraordinary difficulties of the country and the wholly inadequate supply system. It was to be expected that in view of the early approach of winter in the Armenian mountain-plateau the Russians would soon suspend their further attacks for good.
The fighting value of the two Turkish armies in the Caucasus had sunk to an extremely low level, and some divisions were divisions in name only. Privations, heavy losses, and desertion had had devastating effects on the establishments. Enver Pasha was extremely anxious about the coming winter. His troops were without the necessary clothing. Moreover, this region, barren and for the most part unpopulated and desolate, made the supply of the armies extraordinarily difficult. Owing to the shortage of draught and pack animals the requirements of the Turkish soldier in the way of food and military material in the dreary roadless mountains had to be satisfied by carrier-columns, and involved several days' march. Wives and children picked up a meager pittance in this way, but often found death too.
The situation in Iraq at this time was better. For the moment the English had not yet made sufficient progress with their communications to be able to embark on an offensive to revenge Kut-el-Amara. We had no doubt that they would take their revenge, but we were not in a position to judge whether the Turkish forces in Iraq were strong enough to offer a victorious resistance to the English attack. In spite of the very optimistic view of the Turkish General Staff we warned them that they ought to reinforce the troops there. Unfortunately, Turkey allowed herself to be led by political and pan-Islam ambitions to send a whole Army Corps into Persia.
The third Asiatic theater, Southern Palestine, gave cause for immediate anxiety. The second Turkish attempt on the Suez Canal had been defeated in August 1916, in the heart of the northern part of the Sinai peninsula. Following on this occurrence, the Turkish troops had gradually been withdrawn from this region and were now in the neighborhood of Gaza, on the southern frontier of Palestine. The question if and when they would be attacked here seemed to depend largely on the time which it would take the English to complete their railway from Egypt behind their front. The threatened attack on Palestine seemed far more dangerous for the military and political stability of Turkey than an attack in Mesopotamia, which was so far away. We must expect that the loss of Jerusalem — quite apart from the loss of the whole of Southern Arabia which it would presumably involve — would lay a burden on Turkish statesmanship which it would not be able to carry.
Unfortunately, the strategic conditions in Southern Syria were not materially better for the Turkish operations than those in Mesopotamia. In both theaters the Turks, in striking contrast to their enemy, suffered from such extraordinary difficulties in their communications that a material increase of their forces beyond the existing figure meant hunger and even thirst for everyone. In Syria, too, the situation as regards food supply was occasionally desperate. To add to the bad harvest and involuntary or voluntary failures of the responsible authorities, the attitude of the Arab population was pretty generally hostile.
In the course of the war many well-meant representations were made to me in the hope of convincing me that Mesopotamia and Syria ought to be defended with stronger forces, indeed that we ought to pass to the offensive in both theaters. There was a great deal of interest in many German circles in these regions. Without saying as much, the thoughts of these gentlemen were probably straying beyond Mesopotamia to Persia, Afghanistan, and India, and beyond Syria to Egypt. With their fingers on the map men dreamed that by these routes we could reach the spinal cord of British world power, our greatest peril. Perhaps, too, such ideas were an unconscious return to earlier Napoleonic schemes. But we lacked the first elements — sufficient really-effective lines of supply — required for the execution of such far-reaching plans.
XI.4 The Eastern and Western Fronts to the End of 1916
While we were occupied in overthrowing Rumania, the Russians had continued their operations in the Carpathians and Galicia. On the Russian side there had been no intention of giving the new ally direct assistance in her attack on Transylvania, but the continuation of the previous Russian attacks on the Galician front was to facilitate the Rumanian operations. On the other hand, the Russians gave Rumania direct help in the Dobrudja, and indeed from the outset. The reasons for this were as much political as military. Russia no doubt placed high hopes in the Russophile sentiment in the Bulgarian Army. With this idea in view, when the battles in the Southern Dobrudja began Russian officers and men tried to fraternize with the Bulgarians, and were bitterly deceived when the Bulgarians replied by firing at them. Another reason was that the occupation of Transylvania by Rumania aroused no political jealousy in Russia, but Russia could not suffer the new ally to bring Bulgaria to her knees by her own efforts and then possibly force her way to Constantinople or at least open the way there. For the capture of the Turkish capital had been the historic and religious preserve of Russia for centuries.
I need not discuss whether it was good policy on the part of Russia to give the Rumanians no direct support, even by sending Russian troops for a nucleus, and allow her to conduct the operations in Transylvania single-handed. In any case the efficiency of the Rumanian Army and its leadership were overrated, and there was an erroneous idea that the forces of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front had been completely pinned down by the Russian attacks and were absolutely exhausted.
It is true that these attacks did not entirely attain their purpose, but time and time again they produced considerable crises for us. Occasionally the situation was so bad that we were apprehensive that our defense lines would be thrown back from the crest of the Carpathians. Yet the maintenance of these lines was for us a condition precedent to our deployment and first operations against the new enemy. In Galicia too, we had to keep back the Russians at any price. The evacuation of further stretches in that district would have been of small military importance for our general situation in itself if we had not had, immediately behind our lines in Galicia, the oil fields which were of such immense value to us and indeed absolutely indispensable for our military operations. For this cause troops destined for the attack against Rumania had to be deflected to this part of the front when it showed signs of collapse.
But even though we survived the critical situation and brought our campaign against Rumania to a successful conclusion, it cannot be said that the Russian relief attacks had completely failed to achieve their great strategic purpose. It is certainly true that Rumania's allies were not responsible for her downfall. On the contrary, the Entente did everything that their situation and resources permitted, not only in direct association with the Rumanian Army but indirectly through Sarrail's attacks in Macedonia, the Italian offensive on the Isonzo, and lastly the continuation of the Anglo-French onslaught in the West.
As has already been said, we anticipated at the start that, with the entry of Rumania into the war, the enemy would renew his attacks on the Western Front also with all his might — English stubbornness and French élan. That is exactly what happened.
Our role as supreme directors of these battles was simple. For lack of men we could not contemplate the idea of a relief attack either at Verdun or the Somme, however strong were my own inclinations for such a measure. Very soon after I took over my new post I found myself compelled by the general situation to ask His Majesty the Emperor to order the offensive at Verdun to be broken off. The battles there exhausted our forces like an open wound. Moreover, it was obvious that in any case the enterprise had become hopeless, and that for us to persevere with it would cost us greater losses than those we were able to inflict on the enemy. Our forward zone was at all points exposed to the flanking fire of superior hostile artillery. Our communications with the battleline were extremely difficult. The battlefield was a regular hell and regarded as such by the troops. When I look back now, I do not hesitate to say that on purely military grounds it would have been far better for us to have improved our situation at Verdun by the voluntary evacuation of the ground we had captured. In August 1916, however, I considered I could not adopt that course. To a large extent the flower of our best fighting troops had been sacrificed in the enterprise. The public at home still anticipated a glorious issue to the offensive. It would be only too easy to produce the impression that all these sacrifices had been incurred in vain. Such an impression I was anxious to avoid in the existing state of public opinion, nervous enough as it already was.
We were disappointed in our hopes that with the breaking off of our offensive at Verdun the enemy would more or less confine himself to purely trench warfare there. At the end of October the French opened a largely-conceived and boldly-executed counterattack on the eastern bank of the Meuse, and overran our lines. We lost Douaumont, and had no longer the strength to recover that field of honor of German heroism.
For this attack the French commander had abandoned the former practice of an artillery preparation extending over days or even weeks. By increasing the rate of fire of the artillery and trench mortars to the extreme limit of capacity of material and men, only a short period of preparation had preceded the attack, which had then been launched immediately against the physically exhausted and morally shaken defenders. We had already had experience of this enemy method of preparation for the attack in the course of the long attrition battles, but as the herald to a great infantry attack it was a novelty to us, and it was perhaps just this feature which doubtless produced so important a success. Taking it all round, on this occasion the enemy hoisted us with our own petard. We could only hope that in the coming year he would not repeat the experiment on a greater scale and with equal success.
It was not until December that the actions at Verdun died down. From the end of August the Somme battle too had taken on the character of an extremely fierce and purely frontal contest of the forces on both sides. The task of Main Headquarters was essentially limited to feeding the armies with the reinforcements necessary to enable them to maintain their resistance. Among us battles of this kind were known as "battles of material." From the point of view of the attacker they might also be called "battering-ram tactics," for the commanders had no higher ideal. The mechanical, material elements of the battle were put in the foreground, while real generalship was far too much in the background.
If our western adversaries failed to obtain any decisive results in the battles from 1915 to 1917 it must mainly be ascribed to a certain unimaginativeness in their generalship. The necessary superiority in men, war material, and ammunition was certainly not lacking, nor can it be suggested that the quality of the enemy troops would not have been high enough to satisfy the demands of a more vigorous and ingenious leadership. Moreover, in view of the highly-developed railway and road system, and the enormous amount of transport at their disposal, our enemies in the West had free scope for far greater strategic subtlety. However, the enemy commander did not make full use of these possibilities, and our long resistance was to be attributed, apart from other things, to a certain barrenness of the soil in which the enemy's plans took root. But notwithstanding all this, the demands which had to be made on our commanders and troops on this battlefield remained enormous.
At the beginning of September, I visited the Western Front with my First Quartermaster-General. We had to familiarize ourselves with the conditions there if we were to render any effective help. On the way there His Imperial and Royal Highness the German Crown Prince joined us and honored me at Montmédy by parading a Storm Company at the station. This reception was thoroughly in keeping with the chivalrous habit of mind of this exalted prince whom I was to meet frequently henceforth. His merry, frank manner and sound military judgment have always given me pleasure and confidence. At Cambrai, on orders from His Majesty the Emperor, I met two other tried army commanders, the Crown Princes of Bavaria and Würtemberg, and the Prussian Staffs which had been lent to them, and held quite a long conference with the Chiefs of Staff on the Western Front. Their statements showed that rapid and ruthless action was urgently necessary if our terrible inferiority in aircraft, arms, and munitions were at all to be made good. General Ludendorff's immense capacity for work overcame this serious crisis. To my great joy officers from the front told me subsequently that the results of the conference at Cambrai had soon made themselves felt among the troops.
The extent of the demands which were being made on the army in the West was brought before my eyes quite vividly for the first time during this visit to France. I will not hesitate to admit that it was only now that I fully realized all that the Western armies had done hitherto. What a thankless task it was for the commanders and troops, on whom pure defense was imposed and who had to renounce the vision of a tangible victory! Victory in the defensive battle does not release the defender, even when he is victorious, from the permanent oppressive atmosphere of the battlefield, I might perhaps say the spectacle of all its misery. The soldier has to renounce that mighty spiritual exaltation which accompanies a victorious advance, an exaltation of such overwhelming force that a man must have experienced it to realize its true meaning. How many of our brave men have never known this, the purest of a soldier's joys. They hardly ever saw anything but trenches and shell holes in and around which they fought with the enemy for weeks and even months. What a strain on the nerves! How little to brace them! What a strong sense of duty and what self-sacrificing devotion must have been required to endure such conditions for years and silently to renounce all hopes of greater battle fortune! I admit frankly that these impressions gripped me deeply. I could now understand how everyone, officers and men alike, longed to get away from such an atmosphere, and how all hearts were filled with the hope that now at last, after these exhausting battles, a stronger offensive spirit would mean more vigorous operations on the Western Front also.
But for all that, our leaders and their men were to wait a long time yet before those hopes could be fulfilled. Many of our best and finest fighting men had to pour out their heart's blood in destroyed trenches before that stage was reached! It was only when the arrival of the wet season began to make the ground impossible that things became quieter in the battle area of the Somme. The millions of shell holes filled with water or became mere cemeteries. Neither of the contending parties knew the exaltation of victory. Over everyone hovered the fearful specter of this battlefield which for desolation and horror seemed to be even worse than that of Verdun.