IX.1 Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army
As is known, this was not the first time that my Imperial and Royal Master had summoned me to conferences on the military situation and our plans. I therefore expected this time also that His Majesty merely wished to hear my views, personally and orally, about some definite question. As I anticipated being away only a short time, I took just as much kit as was absolutely necessary. On the morning of August 20th I arrived at Pless, accompanied by my Chief of Staff. On His Majesty's instructions the Chief of the Military Cabinet met us at the station. It was from his mouth that I first learned of the appointments intended for me and General Ludendorff.
In front of the castle at Pless I found my All-Highest War Lord awaiting the arrival of Her Majesty the Empress, who had come from Berlin and reached Pless shortly after I had. The Emperor immediately greeted me as Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army and General Ludendorff as my First Quartermaster-General. The Imperial Chancellor, too, had appeared from Berlin, and apparently was as much surprised as I myself at the change in the office of Chief of the General Staff, a change which His Majesty announced to him in my presence. I mention this because here again legend has been at work.
The business of taking over from my predecessor was completed soon after. As we parted General von Falkenhayn gave me his hand with the words: "God help you and our Fatherland."
Neither on taking over my new office nor later did my Emperor, who always held my predecessor in high honor, tell me what were the reasons for my sudden summons to the new sphere. I never had the inclination, and then had not the time, to make inquiries for purely historical reasons. But the decision was unquestionably one of hours and not of days.
IX.2 The Military Situation at the End of August 1916
The military situation which gave rise to the change in our High Command was much as follows, judging by my first impressions:
The situation on the Western Front was not without anxiety. Verdun had not fallen into our hands, and the hope of wearing down the French Army in the mighty arc of fire which we had drawn round the northern and northeastern fronts of the fortress had not been realized. The prospects of a success for our offensive at that point had become more uninviting, but the enterprise had not yet been abandoned. On the Somme the struggle had now been raging nearly two months. There we passed from one crisis to another. Our lines were permanently in a condition of the highest tension.
In the East the Russian offensive in the southeastern part of the Carpathians was sweeping up to their very crests. After our previous experiences it was doubtful whether this last protecting wall of Hungary could be held against the new attack with the forces now available. Moreover, the situation was extremely critical in the foothills of the northwestern Carpathians. It is true that the Russian attacks at this point had died down somewhat, but it was too much to hope that this pause could continue for any considerable length of time.
In view of the collapse on the Galician front, the Austro-Hungarian offensive in the southern Tyrol had had to be abandoned. The Italians, in reply, had themselves passed to the offensive on the Isonzo front. These battles made a very heavy drain on the Austro-Hungarian armies, which were fighting against great superiority and under the most difficult circumstances in a manner worthy of the highest praise.
Lastly, the position in the Balkans at this moment was of importance to the whole situation and the emergencies of the times. The offensive on which, at our suggestion, the Bulgarians had embarked against Sarrail in Macedonia had had to be broken off after gaining preliminary successes. The political objective which was associated with this offensive — to keep Rumania from entering the war — had not been reached.
At the moment the initiative was everywhere in the hands of our enemies. It was to be anticipated that they would put forth their whole strength to keep up their pressure upon us. The prospects of a possibly speedy and victorious conclusion to the war must have inspired our adversaries on all fronts to exert the greatest efforts and endure the heaviest sacrifices. All of them certainly put in their last ounce to give the coup de grace to the Central Powers while Rumania blew a triumphant blast!
The German and Austro-Hungarian armies had few uncommitted and available reserves at the moment. For the time being there was nothing but weak posts, largely customs and revenue police, on the Transylvanian frontier which was immediately threatened. A certain number of exhausted Austro-Hungarian divisions, partly composed of remnants no longer fit to fight, were quartered in the interior of Transylvania. The new formations, which were in course of completion, were not strong enough to be regarded as capable of a serious resistance to a Rumanian invasion of the country. In this respect the situation on the southern bank of the Danube was more favorable to us. A new army, composed of Bulgarian, Turkish, and German units, was being concentrated on the Bulgarian side of the Dobrudja frontier and farther up the Danube. It had about seven divisions of very different strengths.
Such were, generally speaking, all the forces we had available for the moment at the most sensitive of all the sensitive spots of our European theatre — the Rumanian frontier. The other troops we needed had to be taken from other battlefronts, from exhausted units which required rest, or obtained by forming new divisions. But it was just in this last respect that our situation was unfavorable, as was that of our allies. The situation as regards drafts threatened to become critical in view of the perpetual and indeed increasing tension. Further, the consumption of ammunition and material in the long and immense battles on all fronts had become so enormous that the danger that our operations might be paralyzed from this cause alone was not excluded. I shall return to the situation in Turkey later.
IX.3 The Political Situation
My first impressions of the political situation at this time need a short description, as well as those of the military position. I will take that of my own Fatherland first.
When the conduct of operations was entrusted to me I regarded the country's morale as serious, though it had not collapsed. There was no doubt that people at home had been bitterly disappointed by the military events of the last few months. Moreover, the privations of daily life had materially increased. The middle classes in particular were suffering very severely from the economic situation, which affected them exceptionally intensely. Food had become very scarce, and the prospects of the harvest were only moderate.
In these circumstances Rumania's declaration of war meant a further burden on the country's resolution. Yet our Fatherland was even now apparently quite prepared to hold out. Of course, it was impossible to say how long and how strongly this resolution would be maintained. In this respect the course of military events in the immediate future would be decisive.
As regards the relations of Germany to her allies, the propagandist declarations of the enemy press had it that Germany exercised unlimited domination. It was said that we held Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by the throat, so to speak, ready to strangle them if they did not do exactly what we wished. Yet there could not be a greater perversion of the truth than this assertion. I am convinced that nothing showed the weakness of Germany, in comparison with England, more clearly than the difference between the political grip each of them had on their allies.
For instance, if official Italy had ever dared to show an open inclination for peace without British permission, England would have been in a position at any time to compel this ally to continue the policy she had previously pursued simply through fear of starvation. Equally strong and absolutely domineering was England's attitude to France. In this respect, indeed, only Russia was more independent, but here again the political independence of the Tsar's Empire was limited by its economic and financial dependence on England. How much more unfavourable was Germany's position from this point of view! What political, economic, or military weapons had we in our hands with which to repress any inclination on the part of any of our allies to drop out? The moment these states no longer felt themselves chained to us of their own free wills, or by the menace of certain destruction, we had no power to keep them at our side. I do not hesitate to bring forward these incontestable facts as a special weakness of our whole situation.
Now to our Allies in detail.
The domestic circumstances of Austria-Hungary had changed for the worse during the summer of 1916. A few weeks before our arrival in Pless the political leaders there had made no secret to our government of the fact that the Danube Monarchy could not stand any further burdens in the way of military and political failures. The disappointment at the failure of the offensive against Italy, which had been accompanied by far too many promises, had been very profound. The speedy collapse of the resistance on the frontiers of Galicia and Wolhynia had produced a feeling of uneasy pessimism in the great mass of the Austro-Hungarian people, and this found an echo in the Representative Assembly. Leading circles in Austria-Hungary were undoubtedly under the influence of this mood. Of course it was not the first time that pessimistic views from that quarter had found their way to us. They had too little confidence in themselves. As they did not know how to concentrate their resources, they misjudged even the extent of those resources. In saying this I am not ignoring the fact that the political difficulties of the Dual Monarchy were far greater than those of our unified German Fatherland. The food situation, too, was serious. The German-Austrian part of the country in particular suffered very severe privations. In my opinion there was no reason to doubt the fidelity of Austria-Hungary, but in any ease we must make it our business to see that the country was relieved of the pressure upon it at the earliest possible moment.
The domestic situation in Bulgaria was very different — I might say more politically stable — from that of Austria-Hungary. In their war for the political unity of the Bulgarian race the nation was also fighting for the final hegemony of the Balkans. The treaties concluded with the Central Powers and Turkey, in conjunction with her previous military successes, appeared to bring Bulgaria's far-reaching ambitions within range of fulfilment. It is true that the country had entered the new war very exhausted from the last Balkan war. Moreover, nothing like the same universal enthusiasm had marked her entry into the present war as had been displayed in that of 1912. This time it was due far more to cool calculation of her statesmen than to any national impulse. It was no wonder, therefore, that the nation felt satisfied with its present acquisition of the districts in dispute and displayed no strong inclination to embark on fresh enterprises.
Whether their hesitation in declaring war on Rumania — there had been no declaration at the time of my arrival at Pless — was really an expression of that feeling I may take leave to doubt even today. The food situation in the country was good, measured by German standards.
Taking things all round, I considered that I was justified in hoping that our alliance with Bulgaria would stand any military test.
No less confidence did I feel with regard to Turkey. The Turkish Empire had entered the war without any ambitions for the extension of her political power. Her leading men, particularly Enver Pasha, had clearly recognized that there could be no neutrality for Turkey in the war which had broken out. It could not, in fact, be imagined that in the long run Russia and the Western Powers would continue to heed the moderating influences with regard to the use of the Straits. For Turkey her entry into the war was a question of to be or not to be, far more than for us others. Our enemies were obliging enough to proclaim this far and wide at the very start.
In this war Turkey had hitherto developed powers of resistance which astonished everyone. Her active share in operations surprised friend and foe alike. She tied down strong hostile forces in all the Asiatic theatres. In Germany, Main Headquarters was often reproached later on with dispersion of force for the purpose of strengthening the fighting powers of Turkey. That criticism, however, does not allow for the fact that by thus supporting our ally we enabled her permanently to keep more than a hundred thousand men of the finest enemy troops away from our Central European theaters.
IX.4 The German High Command
The experiences of the spring and summer of 1916 had proved the necessity of a single central and completely responsible authority for our army and those of our allies. After negotiations with the leading statesmen, a Supreme Command was created. It was conferred on His Majesty the German Emperor. The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army received the right to issue orders "in the name of the Supreme Command" and make agreements with the Commanders-in-Chief of the allied armies.
Thanks to the friendly spirit and understanding cooperation of the commanders of the allied armies, who had otherwise the same status as myself, I was able to confine the use of my new powers to certain particularly important military decisions. The handling of common political and economic questions was not in the province of this Supreme Command.
My principal task was to give our allies the general outlines proposed for joint operations and concentrate their resources and activities with a view to reaching the common goal. It would have been far better for all our interests if our High Command had been able, by suppressing all private interests, and indeed disregarding all considerations which were only secondary as compared with the main decision, to insist on a decisive victory in one of the main theaters of the war. However, in accordance with the unchanging nature of a coalition war, difficulties were often to crop up for our High Command, as they had to bear in mind all kinds of susceptibilities.
It is well known that in this war Germany was much more the giver than the receiver in her relations towards her allies. But, of course, this statement does not, and cannot, mean that Germany might just as well have fought this colossal war without allies. Further, the view which is frequently expressed that Germany was supported by allies who were merely a lot of cripples betrays a stupid ignorance of the truth as well as bias and exaggeration. This view ignores the fact that at many points our allies were holding up very superior enemy forces.
As I look back over the past, my impression is confirmed that, from the standpoint of the Supreme Command, the most difficult part of our task was not the great operations, but the attempt to compromise between the conflicting interests of our various allies. I will not attempt to discuss whether, in most of these cases, political considerations did not play a larger part than military. One of the greatest obstacles to our plans and decisions was the different quality of the allied armies. It was only on taking over the conduct of operations that we gradually came to know what we could expect and demand from the forces of our allies.
It was during the campaign in Poland that I had first made the acquaintance of the Austro-Hungarian Armies, when they were working in direct cooperation with our troops. Even then they were no longer equal to the demands which we were accustomed to make on our own troops. There is no question that the main cause of the deterioration in the average efficiency of the Austro-Hungarian troops was the extraordinary shock which the Army had suffered in its purely frontal operation at the beginning of the war in Galicia and Poland, an operation which, as I have said, was in my view venturesome. It has been urged that the Austro-Hungarian offensive at that time had the result of breaking the onslaught of the Russian masses. On the other hand, it is possible that this result could have been achieved by a less risky method and at far less cost. In any case, the Russian Army recovered from the losses it then suffered, while the Austro-Hungarian Army did not. Indeed, they converted the bold and enterprising spirit of Austria-Hungary into a lasting fear of the Russian masses. All the efforts of the Austro-Hungarian High Command to make good the great harm that had been done were met by insuperable obstacles. I may be spared a more detailed recital of these. I will only put one question: How could any human agency have succeeded in breathing a fresh and revivifying impulse of common national resolution into the mixed nationalities of the Dual Monarchy after the first flower of determination, enthusiasm, and self-confidence had been blighted? In particular, how was the Officer Corps which had suffered so heavily in the first invasion to be brought to its old level again? Let us not forget that Austria-Hungary never had the moral forces at her disposal on which Germany was able to draw so often and so long.
It is quite an error to suppose that the whole Austrian Army was affected at all points and to the same degree by the progressive deterioration of the troops. The Danube Monarchy had excellent units at its disposal right up to the end. It is true that in many quarters there was a strong leaning to unjustified pessimism in critical situations. In particular, the higher Austro-Hungarian commanders were subject to this weakness. This alone could explain the fact that even after splendid achievements in attack the determination of our allies suddenly collapsed and, indeed, gave place to the reverse.
The natural result of the phenomena on which I have touched was that an element of great uncertainty was introduced into the calculations of our Supreme Command. We were never certain that some sudden collapse of part of the forces of our allies would not face us unexpectedly with a quite new situation, and so throw out all our plans. The troops of every army have their weak moments, for these are part of human nature itself. The general must allow for them as for a given factor, the dimensions of which it is impossible to ascertain. With really good troops such moments are usually quickly overcome, and even in the greatest collapses at least a nucleus of determination and spirit generally survives. But woe betide if this last nucleus too gives way! Disaster, rank disaster, overtakes not only the troops immediately affected, but also those tougher units on their wings or sandwiched in among them. The latter are caught by the catastrophe in flank and rear, and often suffer a worse fate than the poorer troops.
This was frequently the tragic end of troops of ours which were sent to stiffen up the Austro-Hungarian front. Was it any wonder that, owing to this cause, the opinion of our troops about their Austro-Hungarian comrades was not always confident and complimentary!
Taking it all round, however, we must not underestimate the achievements of Austria-Hungary in this mighty contest and give way to those bitter feelings which have many a time been the result of disappointed hopes. The Danube Monarchy remained a loyal ally to us. We have passed through wonderful times together, and will take care not to drift apart, in spirit, in our common misfortune.
The internal framework of the Bulgarian Army was quite different from that of the Austro-Hungarian. It was self-contained from the national point of view. Until the autumn of 1916 the Bulgarian Army had suffered relatively little in the great war. However, in estimating its value we could not forget that quite a short time before it had been engaged in another murderous war in which the flower of the Officer Corps, and, indeed, the whole of the educated classes of the country, had been destroyed. The reconstruction of the army was quite as difficult in Bulgaria as in Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the condition of the Balkan countries, virtually still primitive, hindered the introduction and employment of many means that are absolutely necessary both for fighting and transport in modern war. This made itself felt all the more as on the Macedonian front we were faced by first-class French and English troops. For this reason alone it could not be at all surprising that we had to help Bulgaria not only with material, but also with German troops.
The state of affairs in the Turkish Army was otherwise than in the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian. Our German Military Mission had scarcely had time to make its presence felt before the war, let alone effect a real improvement in the shaky condition of the Turkish Army. Yet they had succeeded in mobilizing a large number of Turkish units. Unfortunately, the army had suffered extraordinarily high losses in the Dardanelles and their first offensive in Armenia. Yet the Turkish Army seemed equal to the task which Main Headquarters first set it — the defense of the Turk territorial possessions. Indeed, it was to prove possible gradually to employ a considerable number of Turkish units in the European theater. Our military help Turkey was practically limited to the delivery of war material and the loan of a large number of officers. In agreement with the Turkish General Staff, the German formations which had been sent to the Asiatic theatres to the autumn of 1916 were gradually brought back, after the Turks had proved themselves capable of taking over and using the material left behind by these formations.
We sent material even to the Senussi on the north coast of Africa. These we supplied principally with rifles and small arm ammunition, with the help of our U-boats. Though these deliveries were but small, they had an extraordinarily rousing effect on the war spirit among the Mohammedan tribes. Hitherto we have not been able to appreciate the practical advantages of their operations to our cause. Perhaps they were greater than we believed at the time.
We tried to assist our brothers-in-arms even beyond the north coast of Africa. Thus we took up the idea which had been mooted by Enver Pasha in 1917, of sending financial help to the tribes of the Yemen which had remained faithful to their Padishah in Constantinople. As the land route thither was closed to us by rebellious nomadic tribes of the Arabian desert, and the coasts of the Red Sea were out of reach owing to the insufficient radius of action of our U-boats, the only way left to us was that of the air. However, much to my regret, we did not possess at that time any airship which could with certainty have overcome the meteorological difficulties of a cruise over the Great Desert. We were therefore unable to carry out the plan.
In this connection I may mention, by way of anticipation, that in 1917 I followed with the greatest interest the attempt to send our protective force in East Africa arms and medical stores by way of the air.
As is well known, the Zeppelin had to return when over the Sudan, as in the meantime the protective force had been driven farther south, and transferred the scene of its operations to Portuguese East Africa. I need hardly say with what proud feelings I followed in thought the deeds, the almost superhuman achievements, of this splendid force during the war. They raised a deathless monument to German heroism on African soil.
Looking back on the achievements of our allies, I must admit that in the service of our great common cause they subjected their own powers to the greatest strain that their individual political, economic, military, and ethical resources permitted. Of course, none of them attained the ideal, and if it was we who more nearly approached that ideal than the others, it was only due to that mighty inward strength — a strength we did not ourselves realize at first — which we had been acquiring in the course of the last decades. This inward strength was to be found in all classes of our Fatherland. It did not slumber, but was always at work, and increased and multiplied even as it worked. It is only when a state is healthy in itself, and an incorruptible life force courses so strongly through it that at the critical moment the unhealthy elements are swept along by it, that such feats are possible as those which we performed, feats which went far beyond our obligations to our allies.
That these things could be is mainly due, as can historically be proved, to the Hohenzollerns, and among them our Emperor William II, in the last epoch of German greatness. True to the traditions of his House, this sovereign saw in the army the best school for the nation, and worked untiringly for its further development. Thus Germany's Army stood out as the first in the world — an imposing guardian of the works of peace before the war, and in the war the very manifestation of our might.
IX.5 Pless
The Upper Silesian town of Pless had occasionally been selected for headquarters by Main Headquarters at previous periods of the war. The reason for its selection was the fact that it was close to the town of Teschen, in Austrian Silesia, in which the Austrian High Command had its headquarters. The advantages that accrued from the possibility of quick personal conferences between the two headquarters were now the main reason why we stayed there.
It was only natural that the German General Headquarters should form a meeting place for German and allied princes who wished to have direct discussion with my Imperial Master on political and military questions. The first sovereign whose personal acquaintance I had the honor of making was the Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria. He gave me the impression of a superb diplomatist. His political outlook extended far beyond the frontiers of the Balkans. He was a past-master in the art of explaining the position of his country and keeping it in the foreground when great questions of world politics were being decided. It was his view that in this war the future of Bulgaria was to be decided by the final elimination of Russian influence and the gathering-in of all men of the Bulgarian race under a single leadership. The Tsar never spoke to me of any of his other political ambitions. I was particularly struck by the way in which the Bulgarian Sovereign conducted the political education of his eldest son. The Crown Prince Boris was to a certain extent the private secretary of his royal father, and seemed to me to be initiated into the most secret political intentions of the Tsar. This gifted prince, with his lofty habit of mind, played the important part entrusted to him most tactfully, modestly keeping himself in the background. Parental discipline was apparently pretty strict.
To all intents and purposes the Tsar conducted the foreign policy of his country in person. I am not able to say how far he also controlled the complicated internal affairs of the State. I believe, however, that he knew how to make his will felt in the parliamentary anarchy of Bulgaria yehich frequently distracted the country. It may be also that he did this by autocratic methods. His task in that respect was no doubt very difficult. Like all the Balkan nations, the Bulgarians had stepped out of servitude into complete political freedom. They had not, therefore, had the training and hard work which accompany the slow transition from one stage to the other. I am afraid that these nationalities, often the possessors of such splendid natural endowments, have still many decades to suffer from the consequences of not having experienced that educative interregnum.
However that may be, the Bulgarian King was at that time one of the most distinguished statesmen. He always proved himself a faithful ally to us.
It was while we were in residence at Pless that the Emperor Francis Joseph died. Both for the Danube Monarchy and ourselves his death was a loss, the full and impressive import of which was only to be appreciated later. There was no doubt that with his death the ideal bond of union between the various nationalities of the Dual Monarchy was lost. With the venerable white-haired Emperor a large part of the national conscience of the conglomerate Empire sank forever into the grave.
The difficulties with which the young Emperor was faced were not to be compared, from the point of view of numbers and complication, with those attending a change of throne in an Empire composed of one nationality only. The new Sovereign tried to make good the loss of the moral cement which the Emperor Francis Joseph's death involved, by making concessions to the various nationalities. Even in dealing with elements which were intent on the destruction of the state he believed in the moral effects of political toleration. The method was a total failure. These elements had long made their pact with our common enemies and were far from anxious to break off relations with them.
The impressions I had gained of General Conrad von Hötzendorf as soldier and commander were confirmed in the frequent and active personal intercourse with him which our residence in Pless involved. General Conrad was a gifted personality, a glowing Austrian patriot, and a wholehearted adherent of our common cause. There was no doubt that it was from the deepest conviction that he proved so obdurate to political influences which strove to break him of that attachment. The general was very broad in his strategic ideas. He knew how to distinguish the central issues of great questions from the desert of secondary matters which had little effect on the decision. He had a peculiarly intimate knowledge of affairs in the Balkans and Italy.
The general was perfectly familiar with the great difficulties which stood in the way of a strong national impulse in the Austro-Hungarian Army and all the defects to which this gave rise. Yet on occasion his great plans were based on an overestimate of what could possibly be expected of the army with which he was entrusted.
I also came to know the military leaders of Turkey and Bulgaria in the course of the autumn and winter at Pless.
In his dealings with me, Enver Pasha displayed an unusually firm and free grasp of the elements of strategy in the present war and the methods required. The devotion of this Turk to our common task, great and heavy as it was, was unlimited. I shall never forget the impression made upon me by the Turkish Generalissimo at our first conference at the beginning of September 1916. At my request he was then describing the military situation in Turkey. With remarkable lucidity, decision, and frankness he gave us an exhaustive picture, and, turning to me, concluded with these words: "Turkey's position in Asia is in some respects very critical. We must expect to be thrown back yet farther in Armenia. It is not altogether improbable that the fighting in Iraq will soon be renewed. Moreover, I am convinced that before long the English will be in a position to attack us in superior force in Syria. But, whatever may happen in Asia, this war will be decided in Europe, and for that reason I put all my available divisions at your disposal."
Nothing more practical and unselfish has ever been said by one ally to another. Nor was it a matter of words only.
Although Enver Pasha took long views about war, generally speaking he had not received a really thorough military training, or what I might call a General Staff training. This was a drawback which apparently applied to all the Turkish Commanders and their staffs. In this respect it looked as if it was a question of some natural defect with the Oriental. The Turkish Army appeared to possess only a few officers who were able to master the technical, inside problems of command, a knowledge of which was essential to the execution of well-conceived plans. They seemed not to realize that the General Staff must necessarily look after the details, even in the execution of great operations. The result was that the wealth of Oriental imagination was often quite wasted owing to a lack of a sense of military reality.
Our Bulgarian colleague, General Jekoff, was a very different character from the fertile-minded Turk. He was a man of remarkable powers of observation, not by any means blind to great conceptions, but essentially restricted in his outlook to the sphere of the Balkans. I am not in a position to judge whether in the last respect he was held in leading-strings by his government. Whether that were so or not, he sincerely believed in the direction which Bulgarian foreign policy was taking. Certainly his views had nothing in common with her domestic policy.
General Jekoff loved his men and was beloved of them. In this connection I remember a remarkable expression he used when doubts were raised as to whether the Bulgarian soldier would not refuse to fight against the Russian: "When I tell my Bulgarians to fight they will fight, no matter against whom." For the rest, the general was not unaware of those defects of his soldiers which sprang from their national character. I shall return to this point later.
In addition to the leading military personalities of our allies I came into touch with their political leaders at Pless. I will confine myself here to a reference to the Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, and the Bulgarian Minister-President, Radoslavoff.
Talaat Pasha impressed me as a gifted statesman. He was in no doubt as to the magnitude of his problem and the poverty of his country's resources. If he did not succeed in eradicating the self-seeking and national indolence which hung like a millstone round his country's neck, it was mainly due to the enormous difficulties to be overcome. It was quite impossible to improve in a few months what had been neglected for centuries and ruined long before the war by the mixture of nationalities and the inward moral exhaustion of many circles in the state. He himself reached the highest position in his country with clean hands, and held it with clean hands. Talaat was an excellent representative of the ancient Turkish chivalry. Absolutely loyal from the political point of view, he met us first in 1916, and said goodbye to us in the autumn of 1918.
The weaknesses of Turkey's statesmanship, as well as her conduct of military operations, lay in their great dependence on the domestic situation. Members of the so-called Committee Government, self-seeking politically and financially, interfered in military affairs, and frequently tied the hands of the generals so that these were unable to improve recognized defects with the resources available. Of course a few really splendid men did everything within their power. But the authority of the state no longer extended into every part of the Empire. Constantinople, the heart of the Empire, beat too feebly and sent no healthy, invigorating, and life-giving blood to the distant provinces. It is true that new ideas had sprung up during the war and grew in quite Oriental profusion with the laurels of the victories at the Dardanelles and on the Tigris. The public began to think of the religious and political unification of all Islam. In spite of the obvious failure that had attended the proclamation of a Holy War, they began to count on the uprising of Mohammedan believers, in Northern Africa for example. The course of events was to show that these examples of religious fanaticism were only the effect of local peculiarities, and that the hope that they would extepd to the distant areas of Central Asia was an illusion — not merely an illusion, but a fatal military peril.
The Bulgarian, Radoslavoff, was more earthly in his political thought than the Turkish statesman with his large views. I venture to doubt whether Radoslavoff ever really appreciated in all its greatness the audacity of the step which brought Bulgaria to our side in 1915. I ought, perhaps, to say the greatness with which the Tsar endowed it. In his foreign policy Radoslavoff was always absolutely loyal to us.
The wild fury of Bulgarian domestic party controversy did not cease, even during the Great War, and was also widespread in the army. Russophile sentiments were a cause of dissension, but the contest between political parties went on among the troops and their leaders also. For this Radoslavoff was partly responsible.