XXIII.1 The Collapse of Bulgaria
In the year 1918, there had been no material change in the domestic situation in Bulgaria. It was still serious, but on the other hand the country's foreign policy seemed to be in no way prejudiced by it. It is true that from time to time news reached us of unauthorized negotiations of certain Bulgarians with the Entente in neutral Switzerland. Moreover, there was no reason to doubt that the American Consulate-General in Sofia was a hotbed of schemes aiming at our ruin. We made a vain attempt to secure the removal of the Americans. Policy demands the use of the velvet glove even in the iron realities of war.
The furious strife between the political parties of Bulgaria continued. The army, too, was compromised ever more deeply. Radoslavoff's enemies had at length managed to secure his overthrow in the spring. The new men assured us of their loyal adherence to the Alliance, and that was the decisive consideration to us. Meanwhile pacifism was making great headway among the Bulgarian people. The question of food supply was becoming more difficult. The army in particular suffered from this cause, or, I should perhaps say, was allowed to suffer from it. At times the soldiers practically starved, and moreover were so badly clad that for a time even the most essential things were lacking. Mutinies occurred, though these were generally kept quiet from us. The army was permeated with foreign elements. Men from the occupied territories were forced into it to keep the units up to establishment. The result was that desertion occurred on an amazing scale. Was it surprising that in these circumstances the morale of the troops deteriorated? It apparently touched its lowest point in the spring. At that time, at the suggestion of the German Headquarters Staff of the Army Group, the Bulgarian General Staff had planned an attack in Albania, west of Lake Ochrida. It was hoped that if this operation succeeded it would effectively close the Santa Quaranti—Koritza road, which was so important for the enemy, and further have a favorable reaction on the moral of the army and the nation. In the end, it proved impossible to proceed with this undertaking, as Bulgarian officers declared that the troops would refuse to attack. An even more serious condition of affairs was revealed when, in May, the Bulgarian troops offered no resistance to the attack of the Greeks and French in the center of the Macedonian front, and abandoned their positions practically without fighting. Most of the divisions told off for the counterattack mutinied.
In the course of the summer, the internal condition of the army seemed to have improved. We gave such help as we could, sent food supplies as well as clothing from our own stock. Moreover, our victories on the Western Front at this time aroused intense enthusiasm in the Bulgarian Army. It was none the less clear to us that this better spirit would soon vanish again if we ourselves suffered any reverses. Even the more favorable reports which reached us at the end of July could leave us in no doubt about that.
As regards the comparative strength of the opponents on the Macedonian front, there seemed to have been no material change in the course of 1918. After the conclusion of peace with Rumania, Bulgaria was in a position to concentrate all her forces on one front. Compared with this reinforcement the withdrawal of a few German battalions from Macedonia did not really affect the question of numbers. One English division had been transferred to Syria, the French troops had sent their youngest classes back home, while the so-called "Royal Greek Divisions," which had just been mobilized, showed little stomach for fighting. It was apparently for this reason that the defense of the Struma sector had been entrusted to these troops. If we could accept the reports of deserters, most of these men were quite ready to join us if German troops were put in line on the Struma front. We therefore sent out to Macedonia a few battalions which could not be used on the decisive fronts in the West. They arrived at their destination at the very moment when the war was decided, so far as Bulgaria was concerned.
In the evening of September 15th we received the first reports of the commencement of the attack of the Entente armies in Macedonia. There was something very striking about this date. Had not Bulgarian soldiers declared in the spring that they would abandon their lines on this day if the war were not previously concluded?
On the other hand it was not less extraordinary that the enemy should select for his attack a sector in the very center of the rugged mountains in which his advance would have been faced with critical difficulties if the Bulgarian troops and their subordinate commanders had shown any inclination to resist. For this reason we thought we could await the development of this battle with confidence, and continue to expect the serious and decisive effort of the enemy in the valley of the Vardar. At that point and in the neighborhood of Lake Doiran, preparations to attack on the part of the English had been observed for some considerable time. Here again we thought that there could be no danger, in view of the extraordinary strength of the defenses, so long as the Bulgarians took the necessary measures. The Bulgarian High Command certainly had the numbers required at their disposal.
The first reports of the course of the battle on September 15th gave no cause for alarm. The first lines had undoubtedly been lost, but there was nothing unusual in that. The main thing was that the enemy had not succeeded in getting right through on the first day. Later reports were more serious. The Bulgarians had been forced back farther north than had at first been thought. The troops which had first taken part in the battle had apparently made little resistance and shown even less resolution. The reserves which came up, or ought to have come up, displayed little inclination to face the enemy's fire. Apparently they preferred to abandon the battlefield to the enemy, and this at a point which was perilously close to Gradsko, the most important center of all the communications in the Macedonian theater.
If Gradsko fell, or the enemy were able to reach it with his guns, the Bulgarian right wing army in the neighborhood of Monastir would be deprived of its most important line of communication, and in the long run it would be impossible to keep it supplied in its present position. Moreover, the Bulgarian army on both sides of the Vardar valley in the center would find its railway connection with the homeland severed. It seemed incredible that the Bulgarian commanders should not realize the peril that was threatening them and bring up every man they had to avert an appalling catastrophe to their main armies.
In contrast to the behavior of the Bulgarian army south of Gradsko, the Bulgarian troops between the Vardar and Lake Doiran had been fighting very strenuously since September 18th. It was in vain that the English strove to force their way through at this point. Bulgarian courage and obstinacy had never been displayed to better advantage. But how could heroism at Lake Doiran help, if faint-heartedness held the field at Gradsko — indeed perhaps something worse than faint-heartedness?
Vain were the attempts of the German Staff to save the situation in the center of the Bulgarian Army with German troops. What could the small and weak German nucleus do when the Bulgarians were running away on the right and left? Entire Bulgarian regiments streamed past the German battalions which were marching to meet the enemy, and openly refused to fight. It was an extraordinary scene. Still more extraordinary were the declarations of the Bulgarian troops. They were off home to their wives and children, for they wanted to see their houses and farms again and look after their fields. Most of them bore their officers no ill-will. If the officers liked to come back home with them they were welcome, but if they wanted to remain on the field of honor they would have to remain alone. The Bulgarians were ready enough to assist any German who got into difficulties while marching to meet the enemy. They helped to get the German guns over bad bits of road. But for the rest they left the fighting to the Germans. Along these lines, Macedonia was certainly lost to Bulgaria. But the Bulgarian peasant told himself that he had quite enough land at home. So he continued on his homeward way and left anxiety and fighting for Macedonia, and the rest of the Great Power business, to others.
Faced with facts such as these, the German Staff, which exercised command from Lake Ochrida to Lake Doiran, found themselves in a desperate position. Anything they could lay hands on in the way of German troops, units on the lines of communication, Landsturm and recruits, were scraped together to bolster up the Bulgarian center and save Gradsko. The prospects of success became smaller every minute. In view of the speed in retreat shown by the Bulgarian center, the only possibility of safety was to withdraw the wings of the army. Such a movement would in itself be of small tactical disadvantage, for in Macedonia great defensive positions lay one behind the other, and the farther north the enemy got the more difficult became his communications. It is true that the communications of the Bulgarians also became much worse when the valley of the Vardar was abandoned. However, it seemed likely that this measure would enable us to save the bulk of the army.
The Bulgarian leaders raised the most serious objections to the decision of the German Headquarters Staff of the Army Group. They believed that their troops would still hold on in their present lines and, indeed, fight. They were also convinced that their armies would dissolve altogether if an order to retreat were issued.
It was a truly desperate position, desperate for all concerned. The Bulgarians complained that there were not enough German troops, and because we had previously withdrawn some of the German troops in this theater. But in any case what could a few more German battalions have done in this general collapse? How many German divisions should we have had to send to defend the Macedonian front? Germany could not seek a decision in the West and send divisions to Macedonia at the same time. The Bulgarians would not realize that Germany's resources were not inexhaustible. The Bulgarians themselves were far from exhausted. What really was exhausted was their own will to fight.
We at Main Headquarters were also faced with fateful problems. We had to try and save whatever could be saved in Bulgaria. We had to send reinforcements, and indeed at once, however hard it was for us. It was on September 18th that the full meaning of this necessity became clear. Just think how fearfully the battle was raging on our Western Front at this time. Only a few days before, the Americans had gained their great success between the Meuse and the Moselle and we were faced with an extension of the attack. The first reinforcements which we could make available were the troops — a mixed brigade — which had been earmarked for Trans-Caucasia and were even then in process of transport across the Black Sea. They were recalled by wireless and ordered to return by Varna and Sofia. But these troops would not be enough. A few more divisions could certainly be spared from our Eastern Front. We had intended to bring them to a quiet part of the Western Front. But what kind of troops were they? Not a man was under thirty-five, and all the General Service men had already been brought to the West. Could anything very striking be expected of them? They might have the best intentions in the world, but in this climate and destitute of suitable equipment for fighting in a mountainous country there were limits to their usefulness on the Macedonian front. Yet it had to be, for not only the Bulgarian Army but the Bulgarian Government and the Tsar must have German backing in this very critical situation.
We also sent reinforcements from the West. Our Alpine Corps, which had just been engaged in very severe fighting, was entrained for Nish. Austria-Hungary also joined in the attempt to help Bulgaria and made several divisions available. We had thus to renounce the prospect of further Austro-Hungarian reinforcements on our Western Front.
Until these German and Austrian reinforcements arrived the attempt had to be made to save the main Bulgarian armies at any rate. With that end in view, and in spite of Bulgarian opposition, the German Army Group Headquarters issued the order for retreat to the Bulgarian armies on the right wing and in the center. Their lines on the Belashitza, north of Lake Doiran, were to form the pivot for the entire movement. During the whole of this time, the Bulgarian army on the left wing had not been attacked. Its lines on the Belashitza and behind the Struma were extremely strong. A few machine guns and batteries would have been quite enough for their defense. Yet confusion overtook this army also. Courage and hard thinking went to a discount. Its commander considered his position untenable and begged the Tsar to conclude an armistice at once. The Tsar replied: "Go and die in your present lines." The remark shows that the Tsar was still master of the situation and that I had made no mistake about him.
The Crown Prince Boris also showed himself equal to the situation. He hastened to the front to save everything that could be saved. But where everyone was losing his head and his resolution what could one individual do, even if he had the love of many and the respect of all?
On September 20th the center army began its retreat in accordance with orders. This led to utter dissolution. Confusion was worse confounded by unskillful dispositions. The staffs failed, the Army Staff worst of all. There was only one man, the Commander-in-Chief, who retained a clear vision and was inspired by firm resolution.
The right wing army had a difficult task. Its main line of retreat was through Prilep on Veles. As the enemy was already quite close to Gradsko, this line of retreat was very seriously threatened. Another road farther west led from the region of the lakes and Monastir through the rugged mountains of Albania to Kalkandelen. At Uskub it met the road through Veles. This tract through the Albanian mountains was safe but very difficult, and it was doubtful whether a large body of troops would find the necessary supplies in that region. In spite of these drawbacks large numbers of troops had to use it. Even larger bodies had to take this route when the enemy captured Gradsko and then pressed forward against the Prilep—Gradsko road from the southeast. Gradsko had fallen as early as September 21st. From being a wretched little village it had become a regular hutted town and its appearance and size reminded one of a brand new American settlement. An immense quantity of supplies, sufficient for a whole campaign, was stored here. Judging by the depots there was nothing to account for the fact that the Bulgarian Army at the front had had to go short. The whole lot was now either destroyed by the Bulgarians or captured by the enemy. It was not only at Gradsko but at many other points that Bulgaria had large depots. Hitherto we had heard nothing about them, as they were guarded by a miserly bureaucracy which in Bulgaria, as in other lands, forms the crust of the national organism in spite of the most liberal laws and a free parliament.
Bulgaria could therefore continue the war as long as she did not, or would not, herself regard it as lost. Our plan, which met with the approval of the Bulgarian High Command, was as follows: The center army was to fall back to the frontier of Old Bulgaria. The army on the right wing was to be concentrated at Uskub or farther north; it would be reinforced by the approaching German and Austrian divisions. These troops would be quite enough to restore the situation at Uskub; indeed if the Bulgarian units were not hopelessly ineffective, we might anticipate that from Uskub we should be able to embark on an offensive towards the south. It seemed impossible that without rest the enemy would be able to bring his strong columns forward to Uskub and the frontier of Old Bulgaria. How would he cope with his supply difficulties as we had utterly destroyed the railway and roads? Moreover, we hoped that the energy and sense of responsibility of the Bulgarian troops would revive when they stood on their own soil.
The proposed operation was only possible on the assumption that Uskub could be held until the Bulgarian troops from Kalkandelen arrived. This seemed to be an easy task, as the enemy was coming up from Gradsko with relatively weak forces.
While all these events were in progress, Sofia was remarkably quiet. On their arrival our battalions, which were intended to calm the inhabitants and protect and support the government, found nothing of the atmosphere of agitation they feared. Life was certainly somewhat peculiar owing to the mobs of soldiers who had deserted their units and were pouring homewards through the town. The men handed in their arms at the depots, took leave of their comrades and officers, while some of them promised to return as soon as they had had time to look after their fields. It was indeed an odd picture and a remarkable revelation of mentality. Or was the whole thing a question of collusion? We had certainly no reason to think that it was so in the case of the men. It is true that this process of dissolution had not proceeded peacefully at all points, but the rumors of horrible outrages turned out to be exaggerated, generally speaking.
There was no change at the front. The retirement of the Bulgarian masses continued uninterruptedly. It was impossible to stop their career, even though the forces of the pursuing enemy were but weak. It was in vain that we tried to get individual bodies — there was no longer any question of proper formations — to form a front against the enemy and offer a real resistance, at least in places. The moment the enemy approached the Bulgarians fired a few rounds and then left their lines. German troops were no longer able to provide a nucleus for the Bulgarian resistance. Equally impossible was it for German and Bulgarian officers, rifle in hand, to produce by their example any effect on the uncontrollable and indifferent mob.
Thus the enemy approached Uskub before fresh German and Austro-Hungarian troops could arrive there. On September 29th, strong bodies of the right wing of the Bulgarian Army emerged from the mountain region and reached Kalkandelen. They had only to make for Uskub by a good road. We were told that the troops were thoroughly keen and fit to fight. The worst of the crisis, therefore, seemed to have been overcome. In a military sense that may have been true, but morally the cause was lost once and for all. That was soon to be proved beyond doubt. Weak Serbian units captured Uskub. The troops at Kalkandelen lost heart. They capitulated. In the evening of September 29th, Bulgaria concluded an armistice.
XXIII.2 The Overthrow of Turkish Power in Asia
The opening of 1918 marked a great revival of the war fever in Turkey. Even before the end of winter, in the highlands of Armenia Turkey opened an attack on the Russian armies there. Russian power in this region turned out to be simply a phantom. The bulk of the armies had already dissolved. The only resistance the Turks met with in their advance was offered by Armenian bands. The difficulties which the nature of this mountainous country placed in the way of the Turks at this season proved more formidable than this Armenian opposition. The fact that the advance proceeded successfully was one of those remarkable manifestations of temporary vigor characteristic of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks crossed the frontier of Turkish Armenia into the region of Trans-Caucasia urged on by various motives: Pan-Islam dreams, thoughts of revenge, hopes of compensation for the territory they had lost, and anticipation of booty. There was yet another reason, the search for manpower. The Empire, and more particularly the portion inhabited by the splendid Anatolian, was absolutely exhausted from the point of view of manpower. In Trans-Caucasian Azerbaijan and among the Mohammedans of the Caucasus new and great sources seemed to be available. Russia had not drawn on these Mohammedans for regular military service, and now they were to fight under the Crescent. The number of the prospective volunteers, as communicated to us, revealed all the wealth of Oriental imagination. Further, if the Turkish reports were to be believed, we had to assume that the Mohammedan peoples of Russia had for long had no more intense longing than to form one great and self-contained Mohammedan nation in the Turkish Empire. But we must not lose sight of the fact that Turkey found fresh resources at her disposal in these regions, and that England would find herself compelled to devote special attention to the development of these events. On the other hand it is just as well occasionally to have some regard for sober reality. We therefore attempted to calm the billows of Ottoman hopes and expectations, unfortunately not with the success that we could have wished. It was agreed, from the point of view of the whole war, that Turkey's principal task lay far more in Syria and Mesopotamia than in the Caucasus and on the Caspian. But what was the good of promises and good intentions in Constantinople when the commanders in the outlying theaters went their own way!
We sent troops to Georgia with a view to securing at least a share of the abundant supplies of raw material in Trans-Caucasia to be used in our joint war. We hoped to help the Georgian Government with the reestablishment of a proper economic system. However, the Pan-Islam fanatics and profiteers in Constantinople would not rest until Baku was in Turkish hands, and this at a time when the ancient structure of Turkish dominion in Asia was about to collapse.
The idea of exercising a paramount influence in Persia led Turkey even farther east. The Turks intended to use Persia as a starting point for a flank attack on the English operations in Mesopotamia, a plan which was good enough in itself, but required time for its realization. It was certainly doubtful whether we should be allowed that time. But it was always possible that the first Turkish movement in Northern Persia would tie down English troops and therefore save Mesopotamia for Turkey. England appeared to be anxious to influence the course of events in Russia through the Caspian Sea and Baku as much as from the White Sea and Archangel. From that point of view the execution of the Turkish plans in Persia and Trans-Caucasia was in our interests also. The only thing was that defense in Mesopotamia and especially in Syria must not be neglected. The formation of an effective Turkish reserve army in the neighborhood of Aleppo would have been far more useful than great operations in Persia, in view of the strategic possibilities open to the English south of the Taurus.
Judging by the map, the situation in Mesopotamia had remained unchanged since the autumn of 1917; but, as a matter of fact, the Turkish armies south of Mosul had suffered a real catastrophe, and that not in battle. As in the Armenian highlands in the winter of 1916-17, Turkish soldiers succumbed in large numbers on the plains of Mesopotamia in the winter of 1917-18. There was talk of 17,000 men who were starving there or had died as the result of privations. We cannot say whether the figures are accurate. "He who starves dies a hero's death," as a Turk once assured us, not from cynicism, but from honest inward conviction. Only fragments of the Turkish army in Mesopotamia survived the winter. It is very doubtful whether they could ever have been brought up to effective strength again. The question was, "Why did not the English attack in Mesopotamia, or, rather, why did they not simply advance?" Were these shades of the ancient power of Turkey enough to keep their enemy to his program of a colonial war? The English Staff may put forward all kinds of reasons for the circumspection of their operations, but the strength of their opponents cannot be one of them.
While the Turkish armies were celebrating triumphs in the mountains of Armenia, the Syrian front had not remained inactive. There had been several frontal attacks on the part of the English which had led to no material change in the situation. In the spring of 1918, the English general seemed at length to have grown tired of this unending monotony. He adopted another line of action, and broke out through Jericho into the country east of the Jordan. He supposed that the Arabian tribes in this region were only waiting for the arrival of their liberators from the Turkish yoke to fall on the rear of the Ottoman armies. The enterprise failed pretty ingloriously against the resistance of weak German and Turkish forces, thanks to splendid Turkish generalship. For the summer the position in Syria was thus saved, for during this season inactivity was usually general in these sun-baked regions. It was all the more certain that in the autumn the English would renew their attacks somewhere or other. We believed that the interval would be long enough to enable us to secure this front by bringing up fresh Turkish forces.
The internal difficulties of Turkey continued during the year 1918. The death of the Sultan had at first no visible effect. At home matters began gradually to improve. The new Sultan was apparently a man of action. He displayed a firm resolve to rid himself of the ancient tutelage of the Committee and to set his face against the serious abuses in the state. He selected the men around him from the circles which had old-Turkish leanings.
I had made the acquaintance of the new Padishah at Kreuznach when he was still the presumptive heir, and had had the honor of receiving him as my guest. In view of the difficulties of direct intercourse, as the Sultan spoke no language but Turkish, we conversed through the medium of an interpreter, and our remarks were practically confined to the exchange of formal addresses. The reply of the heir to my speech was of a very friendly and loyal character. His attitude after he ascended the throne was thoroughly in keeping with it.
One of the Sultan's first resolutions was to exercise personal influence on the organization of the army. He was also anxious to visit the armies in the distant provinces. I am not in a position to say whether such visits would have resulted in material improvements.
The land was completely exhausted by the war. It could hardly give the army anything more. The result was that even during the summer the efforts to improve the situation on the Syrian front were a failure. It is difficult to estimate how much more could have been done in that quarter in view of the positively pitiable communications. The supply of the army was still in a bad way. The troops were not actually starving, but they were practically continuously short of food, physically exhausted, and morally numb.
As I have said earlier on, we had had to renounce the idea of withdrawing the German troops from the Syrian front. The German commander there considered that the position could not be regarded as secure unless German help was at hand. It must be admitted that we did not regard the offensive spirit of the Anglo-Indian Army as very high, especially judging by the evidence we got from Mohammedan Indian deserters. Moreover, the previous achievements of English generalship had been so unimpressive that we felt we were justified in hoping that with the small force at our disposal it would, at any rate, be possible to delude the enemy into thinking that we were still capable of offering further resistance. How long we could keep up the illusion mainly depended on whether the enemy would ever bring himself to embark on a resolute and wholesale operation, and thereby bring down the whole structure of Turkish resistance, with its weak German supports, about our ears.
On September 19th the English opened a surprise attack on the right wing of the Turkish armies in the coast plain. They broke through the lines there practically without opposition. The rapid advance of the Indo-Australian cavalry squadrons sealed the fate of the two Turkish armies on the Syrian front.
It was just at this time that Turkey was robbed of her former land defenses in Europe by the collapse of Bulgaria. Constantinople was thus immediately rendered defenseless on the land side. Of recent times, the Turkish troops at the Dardanelles had become steadily worse. The armies in the outlying provinces had drained them of all men who were of any fighting value. Thrace was unprotected except for some weak coast-defense garrisons which were scarcely fit to fight. The fortifications of the far-famed Chataldja lines consisted of collapsed trenches which had been left by the Turkish troops after the battles of 1912-13. The rest of the Turkish army existed only in imagination or was engaged in the execution of plans which were will-o'-the-wisps. Those who are wise after the event may shake their heads over all this, but at bottom it only revealed the firm purpose to employ all the available troops at the decisive outposts. It would indeed have been disastrous if these outer walls had collapsed and the enemy floods had poured into the very heart of the country.
That heart was now threatened by such a flood. As soon as the first reports of the threatening collapse of Bulgaria arrived certain formations were hastily scraped together and sent from Constantinople to man the Chataldja lines. No resistance worth mentioning, however, could have been expected of such troops. For moral rather than practical reasons we ordered the immediate transfer of German Landwehr units from the south of Russia to Constantinople. Turkey also decided to send all the divisions which had been recalled from Trans-Caucasia to Thrace. A considerable time would elapse before any appreciable force could reach Constantinople. Everything which had been published hitherto leaves it uncertain why the enemy did not use this interval to occupy the capital. Once more Turkey found herself saved from a direct catastrophe. But at the end of September, such an eventuality seemed only a matter of days.
XXIII.3 Military and Political Issues in Austria-Hungary
After the failure of the attack of the Austro-Hungarian armies on Italy, it became ever clearer that the Danube Monarchy had employed her last and best resources in that enterprise. It no longer had the numerical and moral forces to be able to repeat such an attack. The plight of the army was revealed to us by the condition of the divisions which were sent to us as reinforcements for our Western Front. Their immediate employment was quite out of the question if we were to get any good work out of them later on. They needed rest, training, and suitable equipment most of all. These facts were admitted by the troops themselves as freely as by the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. In the relatively short time at their disposal all the Austro-Hungarian officers took the greatest pains to train the Austrian troops to be used in the West to the level of their coming task. If they did not achieve their aim, it was certainly not for want of energy and intelligence on the part of the officers. The men also showed themselves extremely willing.
The great losses of the Austro-Hungarian armies in Italy, their precarious situation as regards drafts, the political unreliability of some parts of the army and the uncertain domestic situation, unfortunately made a really effective and striking reinforcement of our Western Front impossible. In view of all this General von Arz had to grip the soul — in the most literal sense of the words — of every single division he wanted to send us. He himself was entirely convinced of the great importance of this reinforcement. I cannot say whether all circles in Austria-Hungary were permeated by the same desire to help, or whether everyone felt as grateful to us as General von Arz.
During the summer, nothing of any note occurred on the Austro-Hungarian front. The only military event worth mentioning at this time took place in Albania. In that region the opponents had faced one another inactively for years: the Italians in the strength of rather more than an army corps at and east of Valona, and the Austrians in the north of Albania. This theater would have been without any military importance if it had not had a certain connection with the Macedonian front. Bulgaria was always afraid that if the enemy pressed forward west of Lake Ochrida the right flank of their front would be enveloped. From the military point of view it would have been a perfectly simple matter to meet such a move on the part of the enemy by withdrawing the western wing from the region of Ochrida in a northeasterly direction. As I have said before, it was solely due to considerations of Bulgarian domestic politics at this time that the withdrawal of the Bulgarian troops from this conquered district was impossible. To that must be added Austro-Bulgarian jealousies in Albania, which we had great difficulty in composing.
The question has often been asked why the Austrians never drove their Italian adversary from Valona. The extraordinary importance of this naval base as a second gatepost of the Adriatic, a second point from which this sea could be closed, was obvious enough. However, for such an operation Austria-Hungary lacked the essential preliminary — effective communications with the battle area on the Vojusa. Such an enterprise could not be based on the sea, and there were no land communications through the desolate Albanian mountains before the war. Nor had Austria been able to make good this omission in sufficient measure during the war.
In their operations in Albania, the Austro-Hungarians had played the part of a kind of Sleeping Beauty. The sleep had only been disturbed at intervals by raids on both sides, raids which were carried out with small bodies of troops and even less energy. The situation in Albania could be taken more seriously in the summer of 1918, when the Italians took the offensive on a broad front from the coast to the neighborhood of Lake Ochrida. The weak, and to a certain extent very neglected, Austro-Hungarian detachments were driven north. There was great excitement in Sofia and on the Macedonian frontier immediately, and the Bulgarians demanded our intervention, as having supreme military control. This intervention took the form of a request to the Austro-Hungarian General Staff to reinforce their Albanian front so that they could continue to cover the Macedonian flank. The Austro-Hungarians at once decided on a counterattack in Albania, and the Italians were thrown back again.
It is not easy to say whether this Italian offensive had any ulterior military and political goals. In particular, I must leave it in doubt whether it had any close connection with the subsequent Entente attack against the center of the Macedonian front. In view of the amazing difficulties of the country in the Albanian mountains and the enemy's numerical superiority, the Austrian counterattack represented a very remarkable achievement. It certainly deserved to be regarded as such by our allies.
In the course of the year 1918, the domestic situation in Austria-Hungary had developed along the fateful lines which I have already discussed. The exceptional difficulties with the food supply occasionally threatened Vienna with a real catastrophe. It was thus hardly surprising that the Austro-Hungarian authorities, in their anxiety to lay hands on everything available, whether in Rumania or the Ukraine, proceeded to measures which very definitely conflicted with our own interests.
In the dismal political situation in which Austria-Hungary found herself, it was not a matter for wonder that we were informed again and again that it would be quite impossible for the Danube Monarchy to continue the war beyond the year 1918. Anxiety for the conclusion of hostilities found ever more frequent and stronger expression. I will leave undiscussed the question whether, as was alleged, the ambition of playing the part of peacemaker was not the prevailing motive in some quarters.
During the summer, Count Czernin resigned the office of Foreign Minister. The reason the Count himself gave for this step was that the letters written to Prince Sixtus of Parma had created a gulf between himself and his master which could not be bridged. To me the Count was a not unsympathetic figure, in spite of the fact that his political views and mine were in opposition on many points, and though he expressed them as freely to us as we did ours to him.
To me Count Czernin was the typical representative of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. He was clever, fully recognized the difficulties of our joint situation, and was a pointed and ruthless critic of the weaknesses of the political organism he represented. His political plans were directed far more to efforts to avoid disaster than to make full use of our victories. It goes without saying that the Count had an open eye and a warm heart for the interests of his country. The one great exception was that in his judgment of the general situation he could only see safety in renunciation. The result of this contrast was that he never ceased to work for an extension of his country's sphere of influence, even when he was asking us Germans to make great sacrifices for the interests of the whole alliance. Like all Austro-Hungarian statesmen at this time, Count Czernin did not realize of what his country was capable. Otherwise he would never have talked to us in the spring of 1917 — shortly after he took office — of the impossibility of going on any longer, although the resources of Austria-Hungary were destined to suffice for a long time yet, and Austria had not died of exhaustion even at the time he resigned. Count Czemin's processes of thought ran to a kind of mania for self-abnegation. It was not easy to ascertain whether the result of this was that he was unable to offer any opposition to the peace efforts of his Emperor, or whether he was in agreement with these at the bottom of his heart. In any case, the Count did not ignore the dangers of an exaggerated and much too frequently expressed insistence on our readiness to conclude peace, especially when we were dealing with enemies such as ours. This alone can explain the fact that he lost his composure and suggested the Peace Resolution by the German Reichstag at the very time when our U-boat campaign was beginning to make itself felt, the spring offensive of our enemies had failed, and the political dissolution of Russia was having a serious effect upon them.
It was my opinion that Count Czernin never showed us anything but loyal frankness, even when he was facing us with a good many surprises in the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. There is no doubt that what he then feared was that the Danube Monarchy would never be able to survive the breakdown of these negotiations, and that the cry for bread in Vienna demanded an immediate compact with the Ukraine.
While Czernin was conducting the foreign policy of his country, there was no solution of the Polish problem between us and Austria-Hungary. For reasons which I have already mentioned, the idea of surrendering the whole of Poland to the Dual Monarchy was and remained unacceptable.
I had made the acquaintance at Pless of Count Czernin's successor, Count Burian, when he was Foreign Minister in pre-Czernin times. With Burian's dilatory methods, which were displayed in all questions of any importance, I could not hope that the Polish problem would be settled within a measurable period. I must also admit that at this time my attention was occupied with matters more important than these wearisome and futile negotiations.
On his recall to the office of Foreign Minister, Count Burian very naturally directed all his efforts to finding a way out of our political dilemma as soon as possible.
It was only human that under the impression of the military situation in the West, which was steadily growing worse, he should display the greatest obstinacy in pressing for peace. Personally, I was convinced that none of the Allied States ought to desert their posts on the common political front and make offers of peace to the enemy. It was an error to think that in so doing the state in question could secure substantially better terms for itself or all of us. The Turkish Grand Vizier, who visited us at Spa in the first half of September, shared our opinions entirely. The Tsar Ferdinand also expressed the view at this time that there could be no question of peace efforts for his country outside the framework of the whole Alliance. But perhaps the Tsar suspected even then how little importance Bulgaria had as a factor in the calculations of our enemies.
For these reasons, I felt convinced that the Austro-Hungarian attempt to suggest a peaceful compromise with the Entente in the middle of September was unfortunate. In practice, the enemy too showed strong disinclination towards such a step. They realized our situation at this time too clearly to wish to take the path of a peace by negotiation. To them, the question of further sacrifice of life played no part. The enemy's attitude was completely dominated by the fear that we Germans might easily recover if we were allowed a moment's respite, so powerful was the impression which our achievements had made on our foes, and perhaps still make. This may well fill us with a feeling of pride even in the midst of what we are now suffering and will still have to suffer!