Although the situation in Flanders this autumn was extremely serious, we decided on an offensive against Italy. In view of my previous attitude of aversion to such an enterprise, it may cause surprise that I should now obtain the consent of my All-Highest War Lord to the employment of German troops for an operation from which I promised myself little effect on our general situation. On the contrary, I must maintain that I had not changed my views on this question. In August 1917, I still considered that even if we won a wholesale success we should not succeed in forcing Italy out of her alliance with our enemies. I believed that it was as inadvisable to draw German troops from our imperilled Western Front, mainly for the glory of a successful campaign against Italy, in the autumn of 1917 as it had been when the year opened. The reasons why I now approved our cooperation in such an operation were to be ascribed to other considerations. Our Austro-Hungarian allies had told us that they no longer felt themselves strong enough to resist a twelfth Italian attack on the Isonzo front. This news was equally significant to us from the military and political point of view. What was at stake was not only the loss of the line of the Isonzo, but, in fact, the entire collapse of the Austro-Hungarian resistance. The Danube Monarchy was far more sensitive to defeat on the Italian front than to any reverse in the Galician theater. No one in Austria had ever fought with much enthusiasm for Galicia. "He who loses the war will keep Galicia anyhow," was an Austro-Hungarian joke that was often heard during the campaign. On the other hand, the interest of the Danube Monarchy in the Italian theater was always particularly strong. In Galicia — that is, against Russia — Austria-Hungary was fighting only with her head, whereas against Italy she was fighting with her whole soul. It was very significant that in the war against Italy all the races of Dual Monarchy cooperated with practically equal devotion. Czecho-Slovak troops which had failed against Russia did excellent work against Italy. The war on this side formed to a certain extent a military bond of unity the whole Monarchy. What would happen if even this bond were severed?
The danger of such an eventuality at the time at which I am writing was great. To begin with, at the end of August, Cadorna had gained a considerable amount ground in the eleventh Isonzo battle. All previous losses of ground had been misfortunes we could survive. Our multifarious experiences had taught us that they were natural consequence of the destructive effect of offensive weapons against even the strongest defenses. But by now the Austro-Hungarian line of defense had been brought as far back as it could be. If the Italians resumed their artillery preparation and won further ground, Austria-Hungary would not be able to maintain any line in front of Trieste. The threat to Trieste was therefore absolutely critical. But woe betide if that city fell. Like Sebastopol in the Crimean War, Trieste seemed to be the bone of contention between Italy and Austria. For the Danube Monarchy Trieste was not only the symbol of greatness, but of the very highest practical value. The economic independence of the country in the future largely depended on its possession. Trieste must therefore be saved, with German help if not otherwise.
If we succeeded in bringing as much relief to our allies by a joint and far-reaching victory on the southwestern front as we had just done on her Eastern front, as far as we could see Austria-Hungary would be in a position to continue the war by our side. The great battles on the Isonzo front had already been a heavy drain on Austria-Hungary's armies. The bulk of her best troops had been facing Cadorna and lost very heavily on the Isonzo. Austro-Hungarian heroism had won the greatest human triumphs in those battles, for the defenders on the Isonzo had for years been opposed by a threefold Italian superiority, and, moreover, held positions which for desolation and horror were quite equal to our battlefields on the Western Front, and, indeed, in many respects worse. Nor must we forget what immense demands Alpine warfare in the Southern Tyrol had made on the troops engaged in defense there. At many points this warfare was carried on even in the region of eternal ice and snow.
For an operation against Italy the most obvious idea was to break out from the Southern Tyrol. From there the bulk of the Italian armies could be destroyed or dissolved in the great cauldron of Venetia. On no other of our fronts did the strategic contour of the opposing lines offer such favorable prospects for a mighty victory. Compared with this, every other operation must appear practically an open confession of strategic failure. And yet we had to renounce the idea!
In judging our new plan of campaign we must not leave out of sight the intimate connection between our fighting on the Western Front and the war against Italy. Bearing in mind our position in the West, we could spare for the Italian campaign not more than half the number of divisions which General Conrad had considered essential for a really decisive attack from the Southern Tyrol in the winter of 1916-17. We were quite unable to put stronger forces at the disposal of our ally, even though, as actually happened, we considered it possible that our foes on the Western Front might find themselves compelled by their ally's serious defeat to send a few divisions to Italy, divisions which they could spare in view of their great numerical superiority. Another objection to an operation from the Southern Tyrol was the consideration that an early winter might set in before our concentration there was complete. All those reasons compelled us to satisfy ourselves with a more modest objective and to attempt to break through the Italian front on the obviously weak northern wing of the Isonzo Army, and then deal an annihilating blow at the main Italian army in the south before it could retire behind the defenses of the Tagliamento. Our attack began in the region of Tolmino on October 24th. Cadorna had great difficulty in getting his southern armies, which were threatened with destruction, into safety behind the Piave, and then only by leaving thousands of prisoners and a vast amount of war material behind. It was only there that the Italians, associated with and supported by French and English divisions which had been rushed up, found themselves strong enough to renew their resistance. The left wing of the new front clung desperately to the last peaks of the Venetian Alps. We failed in our attempt to capture these heights, which commanded the whole plain of Upper Italy, and therefore to ensure the collapse of the enemy resistance in the Piave front also. I had to convince myself that our strength was insufficient for the execution of this task. The operation had run itself to a standstill. In face of that fact even the greatest resolution on the part of the commanders and troops on the spot had to lower its arms.
However great was my joy at the victory we had gained in Italy, I could not entirely resist a certain feeling of dissatisfaction. At the last the great victory had not been consummated. It is true that our splendid men returned from this campaign with feelings of justifiable pride. Yet the elation of the rank and file is not always shared by their leaders!